| 李琥,李冰洁,赵宏大,林凯颖,王蓓蓓.基于博弈论的保底服务供给模型研究[J].电力需求侧管理,2019,21(6):65-69 |
| 基于博弈论的保底服务供给模型研究 |
| Research on default service supply model based on game theory |
| 投稿时间：2019-07-21 修订日期：2019-08-25 |
| DOI：DOI:10.3969/j.issn.10091831.2019.06.014 |
| 中文关键词: 保底服务 博弈模型 吸脂效应 统一定价 完全市场化 |
| 英文关键词: default service game model cream skimming unifiedpricing complete marketization |
| 基金项目:江苏省电力公司管理咨询项目“新电改环境下电网公司公益性保底服务的运营策略” |
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| 中文摘要: |
| 由于新进入售电公司的“吸脂效应”，原在位者保底服务的供应存在困难。在分析售电公司“吸脂效应”基础上，建立提供保底服务的原在位供电商和新进入供电商的供给需求函数，分别就城市地区统一定价和城市地区完全市场化两种模式建立博弈供给模型，并求解相应的均衡解。本模型对于新一轮电力体制下国内保底服务的规则设计具有一定参考价值。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| Due to the existence of the“cream skimming”of the new company, the supply of default service from the original electricity company has become difficult. Based on the analysis of the“cream skimming”, this paper firstly establishs the supply demand function of the original in position power supplier that provids the default service and the new entry power supplier. Then we discuss two mechanisms, the unified pricing of the urban area and the complete marketization of the urban area separately. Finally, the game supply model is established and solve the equilibrium solution of the response. This model has certain referencing value for the rule design of domestic default service under the new round of power system. |
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