| 钟桦,应志玮,吕征宇,杨建林,黄宇鹏,董力.抽水蓄能电量认购交易机制研究[J].电力需求侧管理,2017,19(5):1-7 |
| 抽水蓄能电量认购交易机制研究 |
| Research on centralized bidding mechanisms for pumped storage capacity |
| 投稿时间：2017-04-27 修订日期：2017-06-06 |
| DOI：10.3969/j.issn.1009-1831.2017.05.001 |
| 中文关键词: 电力体制改革 抽水蓄能市场 集中竞价交易 容量电费 出清模型 奖惩机制 |
| 英文关键词: electricity industry reform pumped storage market centralized bidding transaction capacity cost clearing model reward and punishment mechanism |
| 基金项目: |
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| 摘要点击次数: 1519 |
| 全文下载次数: 1593 |
| 中文摘要: |
| 随着中国电力体制改革的逐步推进，市场化方式成为提高电力系统运行效率的重要途径。为改善抽水蓄能电站的综合效益，研究了抽水蓄能市场的电量集中竞价交易模式。通过对比安徽省和江苏宜兴市的抽水蓄能交易机制，分析了报量不报价模式的不足。在明确了市场参与主体与准入条件的基础上，基于对积极承担抽水蓄能电站容量电费发电厂的鼓励，以及对串谋交易和利用市场力操纵市场等消极竞价行为的惩罚，建立了考虑奖惩的抽水蓄能电站容量电费交易模型。最后，以某市7家发电厂为例，结合具体算例对抽水蓄能市场运行进行模拟，验证了出清模型与奖惩机制的有效性，可以在市场建设初期对市场参与主体有一定的引导作用。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| With the gradual development of the electricity industry reform in China, marketization has become an important way to improve the operating efficiency in the power system.In order to ensure the comprehensive benefit of pumped storage power station, this paper studies the centralized bidding model in the pumped storage market.Based on the comparison between the trading mechanisms in Anhui province and Yixing city in Jiangsu province, the shortage of the mode declaring electricity without price is analyzed.Besides, the participants and access conditions of pumped storage market are defined.Considering the encouragement of power plants actively affording the capacity costs, as well as the punishment of collusion and using market force to manipulate the market, the centralized bidding model of pumped storage station is established.Finally, it takes seven power plants as an example to simulate the market operation.The effectiveness of the clearing model and the reward and punishment mechanism is verified, which can guide the market members in the early stage of market construction. |
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