Game equilibrium analysis on electricity market orienting different bidding mechanisms
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(1.Guangdong Power Exchange Center Co., Ltd., Guangzhou 510030, China; 2. Department of Electrical Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)

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This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51537005);Project of Guangdong Electric Power Exchange Center(No.GDKJXM20172986)

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    Abstract:

    China is in an important stage of electricity market reform. The design of price mechanism in electricity market is one of the core issues of market deregulation. For the bidding mechanism problem which is one of the price mechanism problems, the influence of relative price mechanism and absolute price mechanism on the equilibrium of electricity market is studied.Firstly, a bilevel model is established to simulate the game behaviors in the oligopoly power market under different pricing mechanisms. Subsequently, the model is solved by utilizing the optimality conditions. Finally, based on the case of Guangdong province,scenarios with strategic bidding and without strategic bidding are analyzed. It is found that the relative price mechanism leads to the distortion of unit cost and the increase of generation cost. Compared with the absolute price mechanism, the relative price mechanism can avoid the phenomenon of“free ride”, reduce the demand cost, and inhibit the abusing of market power by strategic generator to some extent.

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别 佩,王浩浩,王 一,张 妍,段秦刚,辜唯朕,陈启鑫.面向不同竞价机制的电力市场博弈均衡分析[J].电力需求侧管理英文版,2020,22(4):02-07.

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History
  • Received:January 07,2020
  • Revised:April 24,2020
  • Adopted:
  • Online: July 28,2020
  • Published:
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