考虑碳-绿证交易与需求响应的综合能源系统合作博弈调度
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作者单位:

(1. 华北电力大学 电气与电子工程学院,北京 102206;2. 国网山东综合能源服务有限公司,济南 250001;3. 国网山东省电力公司,济南 250001)

作者简介:

刘涛(1999),男,安徽滁州人,硕士研究生,研究方向为综合能源;王瑞琪(1986),男,通信作者,山东济南人,博士,正高级工程师,研究方向为综合能源技术、双碳节能技术。

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中图分类号:

TK01;TM73

基金项目:

国家电网公司科技项目(5100-202116567A-0-5-SF);泰山产业领军人才工程资助(NO.tscx202312127)


Collaborative game scheduling of integrated energy systems considering carbon-green certificate trading and demand response
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(1. School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206,China;2. State Grid Shandong Integrated Energy Service Co., Ltd., Jinan 250001, China;3. State Grid Shandong Electric Power Company, Jinan 250001, China)

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    摘要:

    将碳-绿证交易与综合需求响应机制进行联动,有利于优化用户用能行为并减少综合能源系统的碳排放。在此背景下,提出了将碳-绿证交易-需求响应机制与合作博弈联动的方法,并分析了合作博弈中利益分配机制引起的联盟破裂问题。首先,以各个园区为主体组成合作博弈联盟;其次,将碳交易机制、绿色证书交易、综合需求响应机制与合作博弈模型形成联动,促进综合能源系统内各个园区积极消纳联盟内可再生能源,减少碳排放量;接着为了保证合作联盟的成功,提出了一种改进的利益分配方式。最后,通过实际的算例仿真分析,将碳-绿证交易-需求响应机制与合作博弈进行联动的方法促进了综合能源系统的低碳经济运行,并通过改进的利益分配方式在稳固联盟的基础上提高了各个园区参与联盟的积极性。

    Abstract:

    Linking carbon-green certificate trading with the comprehensive demand response mechanism will help optimize user energy usage behavior and reduce carbon emissions from the integrated energy system. In this background, a method is proposed to link the carbongreen certificate trading-demand response mechanism with the cooperative game, and the alliance breakdown problem caused by the interest distribution mechanism in the cooperative game is analyzed. First, each park is the main body to form a cooperative game alliance. Second, the carbon trading mechanism, green certificate trading, comprehensive demand response mechanism and cooperative game model are linked to promote the active consumption of renewable energy in the alliance by each park in the integrated energy system. Reduce carbon emissions. Then, in order to ensure the success of the cooperative alliance, an improved benefit distribution method is proposed. Finally, through actual case simulation analysis, the method of linking the carbon-green certificate trading-demand response mechanism and cooperative game promotes the low-carbon economic operation of the integrated energy system, and through improved profit distribution methods, the enthusiasm of each park to participate in the alliance has been increased on the basis of a stable alliance.

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刘 涛,王瑞琪,刘 松,王 磊,周海妮,朱 峰.考虑碳-绿证交易与需求响应的综合能源系统合作博弈调度[J].电力需求侧管理,2024,26(6):08-15

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  • 收稿日期:2024-07-15
  • 最后修改日期:2024-09-17
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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-11-26
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