基于Stackelberg博弈实时定价机制的电-气综合能源系统优化调度
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(1. 青岛大学 电气工程学院,山东 青岛 266071;2. 国网山东省电力公司 青岛供电公司,山东 青岛 266002)

作者简介:

李宁(1996),男,山东烟台人,硕士研究生,研究方向为综合能源系统经济运行与调度;撖奥洋(1980),男,山东青岛人,高级工程师,研究方向为电力系统调度运行;张智晟(1975),男,通信作者,山东青岛人,博士,教授,研究方向为电力系统及综合能源系统负荷预测、经济调度。

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中图分类号:

TM73;TK018

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(52077108)


Optimal dispatching of integrated energy system based on Stackelberg game real-time pricing mechanism
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Affiliation:

(1. College of Electrical Engineering, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China;2. Qingdao Power Supply Company, State Grid Shandong Electric Power Company, Qingdao 266002, China)

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    摘要:

    为了降低风电和负荷的预测误差对于综合能源系统各机组出力计划的影响,建立了基于Stackelberg 博弈实时定价机制的电-气综合能源系统两阶段(日前-日内)优化调度模型。在日前调度计划中,以综合能源系统经济成本最优确定各机组次日的出力计划。在日内调度计划中,以综合运营商收益最大和用户满意度最大为目标函数,建立主从博弈模型,通过两方博弈对日前能源价格进行调整,从而引导用户积极参与需求响应。通过实际的算例仿真分析,Stackelberg 博弈制定的实时能源价格相较于价格弹性系数矩阵法制定的能源价格,用户参与需求响应的程度更高,不仅可以减少对各机组日前制定出力计划的调整,而且可以降低系统运行成本,提高用户的综合效能。

    Abstract:

    In order to reduce the impact of wind power and load forecasting errors on the output plan adjustment of each unit of intergrated energy system(IES), two- stage(day- ahead and intraday)optimal scheduling model of IES based on the Stackelberg game real-time pricing mechanism is established. In the day ahead dispatching plan, the output plan of each unit for the next day is determined based on the optimal economic cost of the integrated energy system. In the intra day scheduling plan, taking the maximum income of comprehensive operators and the maximum user satisfaction as the objective function, a master-slave game model is established to adjust the current energy price through the two-party game, so as to guide users to actively participate in the demand response.Through the simulation analysis of actual examples, compared with the energy price determined by the price elasticity coefficient matrix method, the real-time energy price determined by the Stackelberg game has a higher degree of user participation in the demand response, which can not only reduce the adjustment of the output plan formulated by each unit in the past, but also promote the consumption of wind power. The model effectively improves the economic benefits of IES and improves the satisfaction of the user side.

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李 宁,撖奥洋,张智晟.基于Stackelberg博弈实时定价机制的电-气综合能源系统优化调度[J].电力需求侧管理,2023,25(4):80-85

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  • 收稿日期:2023-02-21
  • 最后修改日期:2023-05-28
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  • 在线发布日期: 2023-08-24
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